RECENTLY there has been much debate about the cost of heart transplantation, often within the context of national health care expenditures and what society can afford to provide in terms of medical care for its citizens.`Heart transplantation is generally viewed as a costly technology with obvious benefits, although there is not a consensus as to whether the benefits are sufficient given the cost of the procedure.7' This has led to considerable disagreement as to whether heart transplantation is an experimental or a therapeutic procedure. 9 Claiming the procedure is the former, both public and private insurers have in the past refused payment, frequently bringing upon themselves the wrath of the medical community as well as patients. 4 
''
Gradually this nearly intolerable situation has changed, but not without serious reservations." Payers remain concerned that transplant costs will increase as a function of increased donor organ availability, which means already scarce health care resources will be maldistributed to take care of the needs of a small proportion of sick people. 12 It is along these lines, for example, that skeptics argue resources allocated to heart transplantation would be better spent on preventive health care initiatives."15 16 However, the gains reportedly associated with preventive health care measures are by no means clear, and are also controversial. 17 Responding to the need to make a decision about Medicare coverage of heart transplants, then Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), Patricia Roberts Harris, announced on June 12, 1980 , that a major study would be conducted on heart transplantation which would " . . .examine, in general, all aspects of heart transplants, including the scientific, social, economic, and ethical issues, and, in particular, the impact of a possible Medicare decision EVANS of the above-mentioned institutions for cardiac transplantation between January 1, 1978, and June 30, 1983 , were also abstracted according to standard abstraction procedures.23 (3) Data were obtained directly from 152 living heart transplant recipients and the next of kind of 68 heart transplant recipients.24 (4) To project the proliferation of heart transplant centers, a survey was conducted, in cooperation with the American Hospital Association, of all hospitals in the United States with open heart surgery facilities (n = 648).25 (5) Attitudes of the general population toward organ donation was the subject of a national probability sample survey, conducted in cooperation with the Gallup Organization, Inc., of U.S. households (n 2056). 26 Details on all aspects of each of these surveys, including sample size, data collection instruments, survey protocols, survey procedures, and response rates, are fully described in the complete report from the NHTS. 22 As relevant to the topic under consideration, the results of these various surveys will be presented, although the medical and hospital records and the survey of living patients are the primary sources of data. Selected descriptive data on living heart transplant recipients are provided in table 1. Also, information contained within the final report of the National Task Force on Organ Transplantation has been incorporated into the analyses, as appropriate.11 The Task Force report, as it will be referred to here, consists of an analysis of the following: (1) public and private efforts to procure organs for transplantation, (2) problems in coordinating the procurement of viable human organs, (3) the education and training of health professionals with respect to organ procurement, (4) equitable access by patients to organ transplantation, (5) barriers to the donation of organs to patients, (6) factors involved in insurance reimbursement for transplant procedures by private and public insurers, (7) the manner in which organ transplantation is diffused among and adopted by qualified medical centers, and (8) the feasibility of establishing a national registry of human organ donors.
Results
The results of this analysis are organized according to three major topics costs, benefits, and payment. Costs can be evaluated at two levels -per procedure and total program expenditures.27, 28 Several indicators are available to assess the benefits of transplantationsurvival, functional ability, employment, and quality of life.29 30 Finally, payment issues can be related directly to two large categories of payers -public (government) and private (insurance companies. .) To facilitate the presentation of the results, each major topic will be discussed according to the preceding distinctions.
Costs. Often the economics literature distinguishes costs (what it takes to actually produce a good or service) from charges (what an individual is billed for a good or service).3' While this distinction is important, the term cost will be used synonymously with charges, unless otherwise indicated. Clinicians and patients generally concern themselves with charges, while hospital administrators and policymakers are primarily interested in actual costs. The Medicare program, for example, before the introduction of prospective payment, reimbursed on the basis of costs, not 64 A further useful distinction is that between procedure costs and program costs. Each transplant procedure has a certain cost associated with it, often referred to as the procedure cost. A hospital bills a payer for the cost of the transplant procedure. Program costs are equivalent to the aggregated procedure costs for which a given payer is responsible. For example, at the end of a pay period (a quarter, a year), a given payer will have accumulated costs associated with a particular procedure. The total of these costs constitute the program costs to the payer. While most payers are concerned with per-procedure costs, today coverage decisions are just as likely, if not more likely, to be based on actuarial assessments of projected program expenditures. Thus, concerns about high procedure costs may be lessened if aggregate program costs can be demonstrated to be minimal. Because of donor supply considerations, most insurers consider heart transplantation to have minor implications from the perspective of pro-Procedure costs. In the literature, sparse as it is, the cost of a heart transplant is subject to wide variation. In general, transplant teams report considerably lower per-procedure costs than do payers. Insurance actuaries are particularly prone to high cost estimates. 7 Unfortunately, a few outlier cases can have an enormous impact on per-procedure costs that are based on statistical averages. While outlier cases are important and should be scrutinized carefully, they should not be overly influential in the derivation of actuarial cost estimates.
Most heart transplant procedure cost estimates are seriously flawed by the inadequate conceptualization of costs.7 In assessing the cost of a transplant procedure, it is generally useful to think of the transplant as having several distinct cost components. These are as follows: (1) pretransplant costs, (2) evaluation and screening costs, (3) candidacy costs, (4) transplant costs, and (5) 66 change the mix of transplant recipients.37-39 For example, older and sicker patients are now undergoing the procedure. Some of these cases have proven to be both complicated and costly. Thus, the short-term gains that have been experienced may be minimized as transplant teams choose to take on more complicated and challenging cases. Without being arbitrary, it seems that in the interests of both costs and effectiveness, more stringent patient selection criteria should be adhered to -there is already an inadequate supply of donor hearts to meet the projected need for the procedure. 30 Program costs. Heart transplantation is frequently criticized because of its reportedly high cost to society. These costs are usually calculated by multiplying estimates of the need for heart transplantation by an average cost per transplant procedure. 40 41 The problem with such estimates is that they ignore the availability of donor organs -the major constraint on transplant activity. In the absence of a viable mechanical alternative, cardiac transplantation will never consume enormous resources when compared with a wide variety of other approaches to treating patients with end-stage diseases.4 Thus, it goes without saying that all estimates of program costs should be predicated on estimates of donor supply. 3 Moreover, payers must evaluate how many of their beneficiaries may require a heart transplant, and then how many donor hearts are likely to be available for these patients. This is essentially how the issue was addressed in the NHTS to calculate Medicare program costs. The details of the approach are described below.
Many attempts have been made to assess the need for heart transplantation in the U.S. population. Estimates have ranged between 1000 and 75,000 people, with 35,000 being the most frequently cited figure. 35 Based on a careful analysis of mortality data, it was concluded in the NHTS that about 14,100 people die each year who could conceivably benefit from a heart transplant. 35 Of these people, it was predicted that only about 1900 would be accepted as bona fide transplant candidates. It was further estimated that of the 14,100 people, only about 1200 would be eligible for Medicare and, of these, only 85 would meet all the selection criteria for transplant recipients.'3 It should be noted that people qualify for Medicare only if they meet one of the three following conditions: (1) they are age 65 years or over, (2) they have been permanently disabled for a period of about 2.5 years, or (3) they have endstage renal disease.
The next step in the analysis was to evaluate the potential organ donor pool. This was accomplished through an analysis of in-hospital death data. Based on these data, and information on the willingness of people to donate organs, it was concluded that only 7000 to 9000 hearts were available per year for transplantation. 35 Because these figures were considered to be highly speculative, data on actual kidney donors were evaluated to determine how many of these individuals could also have been heart donors. Based on this analysis, it was concluded that somewhere between 325 and 866 hearts may have been available in the most recent year for which data were available. 22 The third step was to use the foregoing data to project the need for heart transplantation and the availability of donor hearts over the next several years. The estimates derived at the time of the study are shown in table 5. As shown, the need for heart transplantation was expected to increase modestly from 1985 through 1986 for both the U.S. population as a whole and Medicare beneficiaries as a group. Similarly, the number of donor hearts was expected to increase.
The final step in the analysis was to relate the need and supply estimates to Medicare coverage assumptions that, in turn, were multiplied through by average per-procedure transplant costs to Medicare. The results of this analysis are shown in table 6. The base case assumed existing Medicare entitlement rules remain unchanged (see above). Expanded coverage assumed that Medicare benefits were extended to virtually all patients in need of heart transplants, constrained, of course, by donor supply.22 Finally, expanded coverage and higher volume assumed that additional donor organs became available so a larger number of patients could be accommodated. As table 6 indicates, total Medicare program costs depend on two factors -the scope of the coverage decision and the availability of donor hearts.
In summary, the procedures used here could be used by any payer to calculate their program costs associated with the coverage of heart transplantation. Some caution should be exercised in deriving such estimates since program costs entail more than the mere costs associated with transplantation per se. Many more patients will be evaluated than receive heart transplants. Should the evaluation represent additional clinical work-up over and above the usual management of the end-stage cardiac disease patient, these costs are properly allocated to the heart transplant program. Also, if patients who have been declared candidates for heart transplantation are managed more Since the introduction of new immunosuppressive drugs and techniques, along with better methods of detecting rejection of the transplanted heart, the outlook for the survival of cardiac transplant recipients has improved markedly. It is now estimated that over 85% of all heart transplant recipients will live 1 year, over 50% will live 5 years, and nearly 25% will live 10 years or longer.49 Survival, of course, is dependent on many factors and varies across transplant programs, with the very experienced teams enjoying the greatest success. Nonetheless, it is evident that cardiac transplantation is a transferable technology, and that centers with relatively modest experience in cardiac transplantation, but with clinical services and expertise available in transplantation more generally, can achieve very good results. As acknowledged by most in the field, the cardiac surgery per se is considerably less significant than the postoperative management of the transplant recipient.
Based on data collected during the course of the NHTS, it was found that the relative risk of mortality for female patients was 1.3 times that of male patients, while whites had a relative risk that was 1.2 times that of nonwhites.49 These differences in relative risk did not prove to be statistically significant. The relative risk of mortality associated with the period during which the transplant was performed was found to decrease over time, with the least risk associated with the period 1980 to 1983. These differences in relative risk were found to be highly significant. The relative risks associated with age at transplant and level of functional impairment were each found to be statistically significant. Younger patients were at lower risk of death, as were patients who had less functional impairment before the transplant.
Results of comparisons of survival between the recipients of heart transplants and patients who died while awaiting a donor heart were as expected. In general, patients who received a transplant did so within 35 days, while nontransplanted candidates died within 45 days.50 These survival times mirror the historical experience of the Stanford heart transplant program. Thus, based on these results, it is evident that heart transplantation does prolong life, even after adjustments are made for patient selection factors.
Historically, this has been a matter of some debate. Table 8 provides a unique patient perspective on the level of preoperative and postoperative functioning. As shown here, many of the patients had a significant level of disability before the transplant. After the procedure they improved considerably, although many patients still indicated they were limited in vigorous activities, had trouble bending, stooping, or lifting, and were unable to do certain amounts of work, housework, or schoolwork. About two-thirds of patients felt they were limited in some way.
Employment status. Extensive data were obtained from all patients or, in the case of deceased patients, their medical records, as to their employment status. For Although not always recognized, the debate about whether a given health care technology is experimental or therapeutic is closely linked with the coverage determination process. For example, for nearly 2 years after heart transplantation had gained momentum within the medical community as a therapeutic procedure, both private and public insurers denied payment on the basis that the procedure was "experimental." As noted, only recently has Medicare revised its policy.
Before the NHTS, a controversial report on heart transplantation noted the grave consequences of a "national heart transplant program.",40'4' This was at odds with a technical memorandum issued by the National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute that pointed out that the severe shortage of donor hearts would seriously constrain the program expenditures associated with heart transplantation. 68 The NHTS reaffirmed this conclusion. 3 On May 2, 1985, then-Secretary of the DHHS Margaret Heckler officially released the final report of the NHTS.69 At that time she noted that a further review of the data was necessary and an intramural interagency task force was convened for this purpose. The report of the task force was issued on October 8, 1985 With respect to issue A, the task force recommended option 1 and in so doing stated that "PHS [Public Health Service] now recommends that if the institution and patient selection criteria are applied, cardiac transplantation is deemed not only safe, effective and widely accepted, but also reasonable and necessary." As for issue B, the task force recommended option 1 -publish a notice in the Federal Register -which had several advantages, including diffusing the controversial aspects of coverage. The only disadvantage associated with this option was that it "could result in a substantial delay in putting coverage of heart transplants into effect." Under the preferred option, the economic implications of Medicare coverage were again minimized, Vol. 75, No. 1, January 1987 consistent with the final report from the NHTS. It was estimated that between $0 and 5 million would be expended in fiscal year 1986 and up to $25 million would be spent in fiscal year 1990, assuming that Medicare entitlement rules remained unchanged. 70 The memorandum further estimated that about 10 institutions would qualify during the first year and about 20 during the next year.
Consistent with the memorandum referred to above, on June 27, 1986 , the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, Otis R. Bowen, M.D., announced that Medicare would soon begin covering heart transplants for people who are currently eligible for Medicare. He also indicated that reimbursement would be targeted to selected heart transplant facilities across the country. Citing the growing evidence of the safety and medical effectiveness of the procedure, Secretary Bowen said: "Heart transplants when performed in specialized facilities by trained personnel on patients who have been carefully screened, will be considered reasonable and necessary treatment and will be covered by the Medicare program. We expect to propose soon in the Federal Register the criteria that facilities would have to meet to be eligible to perform Medicare-covered heart transplants." The proposed criteria are aimed at identifying facilities with the necessary experience and expertise. Bowen noted that he expected that the criteria would address such issues as: (1) a "level of experience" factor regarding the volume of heart transplants the facility has performed in the past and the survival rate of heart transplant recipients, (2) patient selection criteria to identify those who would most likely benefit from the procedure and represent the best candidates for successful transplantation, and (3) factors that particularly contraindicate heart transplantation. Medicaid Given prevailing patient selection criteria for heart transplantation, it is evident that the number of patients for whom Medicaid programs would be responsible is exceedingly small.72 This, however, was not and, to some extent, is not recognized by the directors of many Medicaid programs.L acking direction at the federal level, Medicaid programs have been forced to independently develop their own policies. 63 Overall response has been rather timid. Initially claims for coverage of heart transplants were denied on the basis that the procedure was experimental and, thus, exempt from coverage. This continues to be the case to some extent today, although the Intergovernmental Health Policy Project (IHPP) at George Washington University has recently compiled a great deal of information on the response of Medicaid programs. 63 The IHPP group found that most states had paid for some transplants, either as part of established policy or on an individual basis.63 Not surprisingly, the most frequently covered procedure was kidney transplants, followed by bone marrow, liver, heart, heart-lung, and pancreatic transplants. Twenty-four states and the District of Columbia have reimbursed providers for heart transplants.
Many states have either developed criteria or are in the process of developing criteria that specify those medical conditions for which organ transplantation is considered appropriate. Moreover, some states have developed standards that facilities must meet to qualify as transplant centers. With regard to this latter point, certificate-of-need provisions are occasionally invoked by state officials to limit the proliferation of transplant centers. Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Ohio are three states with such provisions. 5 7' 73' 74 Recognizing the quandary within which they have Private Insurance Coverage. Private insurers were forced to confront the heart transplant issue at a very inopportune time -they were grappling with the reluctance of employers to pay increasing health insurance premiums.14 For example, the Chrysler Corporation determined that $600.00 of the cost of each new car went to employee health care benefits. In general, employers were actively looking for ways to reduce costs, one of which was reducing benefits by making employees responsible for a larger share of their health care bill through the payment of deductibles and copayments. Also, an increasingly attractive approach was to force third-party payers to compete for contracts to provide health care services.
In deciding coverage issues, insurers are generally pragmatists. With respect to heart transplantation, they sought answers to two questions: (1) How many people needed a heart transplant? (2) How much did it cost? Based on early estimates of donor availability and transplant costs, private insurers began to offer cover- APercentages may not equal 100% due to rounding error.
age for heart transplantation in 1983, often without increasing insurance premiums. Even when an increase was indicated, however, it was often modest. For example, Blue Shield of California estimated that an additional 5 cents per contract per month was required to include heart transplant coverage. * In short, many private insurers, unlike public insurers, realized that their potential liability for heart transplants was minimal.
Massachusetts Blue Cross and Blue Shield was among the first of several private insurers to publicly come forth with a revised policy with respect to heart transplants. This occurred in October, 1983. In May, 1984, Blue Shield of California announced that it would cover heart transplants, but only those performed at Stanford University Medical Center. It is noteworthy, however, that Blue Shield of California, like many private insurers, previously dealt with the heart transplant issue on a case-by-case basis. by companies in the United States in 1982. Of the companies that responded, 28 (or 82.1%) indicated that they had reimbursed for heart transplants. By mid 1984, the majority of private insurers were routinely covering heart transplants.
Recently both the Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association and the HIAA have conducted surveys of their membership regarding coverage of organ transplants in connection with the activities of the National Organ Transplantation Task Force. The combined results of these surveys show that over 80% of all private insurers pay for heart transplants.`3 Unlike public insurers, most private insurers and the associations with which they are affiliated have at least for now resolved the heart transplant coverage issue. This has not, however, eliminated the policy-relevant fears they experience in contemplating the future expansion of the organ donor pool. Certainly, if there were a significant increase in the supply of donor hearts, the total cost of heart transplantation would increase proportionately. This, in effect, is what has immobilized public insurers: they fear the possible creation of another $2.0 billion per year program such as that which was developed for end-stage renal disease.
Discussion
Payment for heart transplants will remain a controversial issue. Those who question the wisdom of covering the procedure and those who endorse it are at great odds. There is relatively little common ground on which a reasonable debate can take place. Those commentators with an ideologic predisposition to preventive health care strategies as the solution to the heart transplant dilemma are enamored with fiction and befuddled by fact. Those who endorse coverage of heart transplants are interventionists who feel that little can be gained by idle talk; they tend not to confuse motion with progress. They recognize the limits of the technology they have chosen to support, and believe that further improvements are possible through concerted research and development efforts. They are convinced that there is little to be gained by wishing away a problem that already exists people die of preventable end-stage cardiac disease that, following onset, is amenable to treatment.
The skeptics and preventionists are not, however, completely devoid of sensible argument. There is, for example, reason to be alarmed about the rapid proliferation of heart transplant programs in the United States, up from 14 in 1983 to over 80 today.25 Coverage of heart transplants, of course, facilitates the diffusion of such programs, which in turn may be detrimen-tal to patient outcome and result in higher transplant costs. For these reasons, several task forces, including the National Task Force on Organ Transplantation, and various professional associations, including the American Society of Transplant Surgeons and the American Society of Transplant Physicians, have developed explicit transplant center criteria." Similarly, the HIAA and the national office of the Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association have adopted similar criteria that include staff and facility requirements, performance standards, and minimum annual volume requirements. '1`I n general, criteria such as these are readily accepted by established heart transplant centers, but are viewed with suspicion by inexperienced and often unqualified centers. The inexperienced centers register strong objection because they are convinced that they are being precluded from being able to freely practice medicine. As a result, antitrust litigation may eventually be filed.
As prudent purchasers of health care services, both public and private insurers have an interest in making certain that their beneficiaries receive the highest quality of care at the least cost. The concept of designated transplant centers is critical to both establishing and maintaining cost-effective transplantation services.
In addition to abetting debates about the value of preventing rather than treating end-stage cardiac disease, heart transplantation has thrust into the limelight a variety of other issues that have, in the past, received only limited attention and relatively little serious discussion. These issues also concern the manner in which the health care dollar is spent and who benefits.
As noted in the introduction to this article, it is difficult to separate the heart transplant dilemma from other health care issues this nation must face. Despite attempts to slow the growth of health care costs, health care expenditures are projected to increase from $387 billion in 1984 to $660 billion in 1990, reaching almost $2 trillion by 2000, at which time they will constitute 14% of the gross national product.9 Per-person health care expenditures per year will rise from $1500 in 1984 to almost $7000 in 2000.
The case of the uninsured poor is clearly a dilemma of major proportions. Between 1980 and 1982 the proportion of the nation's poor without either Medicaid or private insurance rose by 20%, while free care available at hospitals increased at a meager 4% .' By the mid 1990s voluntary nonprofit hospitals will provide even less free care than is available today. There are few options available to respond to the specific needs of the 35 to 40 million people in the United States who will be uninsured by the mid 1990s.
Finally, insurance for catastrophic illness has at least been recognized by President Reagan as a matter in need of immediate attention. While 85% of the population has some form of private or public insurance, the coverage is often inadequate for certain catastrophic illnesses, such as those requiring transplants.
A special task force has been appointed to look into problems associated with catastrophic health insurance and to report on potential solutions. Related to this whole issue is the need to carefully examine the longterm care issue, which is nearly inseparable from that of catastrophic health insurance.
Despite these other pressing problems, the public remains supportive of the development and application of expensive organ transplant technology.77 There is no evidence of public upheaval that suggests that the nation should be spending its health care resources on other technologies or preventive health care strategies.
As a matter of academic debate, it could be argued that the public is not sufficiently informed to make the choices it inevitably must make. While this is true to some extent, the public is becoming better informed as a result of initiatives such as Oregon's Health Decisions and Washington's Health Choices, groups that are intent on incorporating public input into difficult decisions as to how the health care dollar should be spent. 7 Also, health maintenance organizations, such as the Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound, have initiated public forums to discuss the merits of coverage for expensive technologies such as heart transplants.
Perhaps the biggest problem associated with these initiatives is the tendency to isolate health care choices from larger resource allocation and rationing decisions that society must make. 60"6 For example, what is the appropriate expenditure level for social and defense programs in comparison with health programs? Focusing too narrowly on the issues at hand may excessively limit the range of opportunities available, but to consider the entire range necessarily complicates the decision making process. Moreover, it is by no means clear that the health care environment of today is accurately depicted by some of the more vocal commentators, such as Governor Richard Lamm of Colorado.80 The naive rhetoric offered by those of a fixed-budget mentality is neither consistent with public opinion nor imaginative and, as a result, public health care policy
